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Forthcoming in socio-economic review 
 
State of the art: 
The politics of employment-friendly welfare reforms in post-industrial 
economies1  
 
Silja Häusermann, Bruno Palier 
 
Introduction: goals and outline 
This article identifies and discusses key debates in the literature on the politics of employment-friendly 
welfare reforms in post-industrial economies. The literature on the relationship between welfare 
institutions and labor market performance has shown that welfare states are not necessarily 
detrimental to economic performance2. If welfare institutions and labor markets are 
complementary, the effects may rather be positive. However, the welfare institutions that 
enhanced labor market performance in the industrial age may weaken this performance in a 
different, post-industrial context. An ample literature indeed shows that the transition to post-
industrialism has generated a range of new tensions between welfare arrangements and labor 
market performance, which confront today’s welfare states with new challenges for employment-
friendly recalibration. Hence, one of the major questions in the political science welfare state 
literature of the past one or two decades has been whether, how, and to what extent current 
welfare states are able to deal with these challenges and to adapt to the conditions and needs of 
post-industrial labor markets. This literature is the subject of the present article.  
The goal of this article is twofold: on the one hand, we present our reading of the literature on 
employment-friendly reform politics in mature welfare states. Both these politics and the 
literature that theorizes and analyzes them are evolving dynamically. Therefore, our discussion of 
the literature cannot be an exhaustive presentation of the topic, but rather provides an interim 
overview of the major research in this area. The second goal is to propose and discuss a range of 
current and new research frontiers and open debates, of which we think that they will strongly 
benefit to our understanding of the conditions of employment-friendly reforms in mature welfare 
states. 
This article is structured as follows: A first part reviews the post-industrial challenges to mature 
welfare states and labor markets: globalization, de-industrialization and demographic changes. We 
then review a range of typical, post-industrial welfare-employment tensions resulting from these 
challenges. This provides us with an understanding of what the current literature defines as 
employment-friendly policy reforms: flexicurity, activation, work-care conciliation and social 
investments in human resources and skills.  
                                                
1 This paper is based on a report done within the framework of the European Network of excellence RECWOWE 
(Reconciling Work and Welfare) – http://recwowe.vitamib.com. The authors would like to thank the participants of 
the 2007 Recwowe-meeting in Warsaw, as well as the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.  
2 The early Keynesian literature (Keynes 1986, Weir et al. 1988 etc.) argued that welfare states are actually a 
precondition for efficient economies and labor markets. Both capitalists and workers need certain guarantees in 
terms of stability, job and earnings security to work productively in the long run. More recent and specific studies 
focus on the effect of the total welfare effort on job performance (see e.g. Atkinson 1995, Kvist 2002), on the effects 
of wage coordination and wage moderation on employment (e.g. Calmfors and Driffill 1988, Pontusson and 
Swenson 1998, Mares 2006) or on the impact of the mode of welfare financing on job performance (e.g. Palme 1998, 
Deakin and Parry 2000 etc.).  
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The main part of the article then reviews our reading of the literature on the politics of these 
employment-friendly welfare reforms, focusing on actors, preferences and institutions. In section 
2, we focus on the prominent institutionalist literature that deals with the general capacity for 
reform in mature welfare states: Can industrial welfare states be reformed in an employment-
friendly way? What are the conditions for the implementation of unpopular “commodifying” 
reforms, and what are the factors that explain success or failure of post-industrial recalibration? 
In section 3, we focus more specifically on the regime-specific reform-politics, since post-
industrialism confronts different welfare regimes with very different challenges. In this section, 
we review literature on the respective agendas, politics and reform determinants in Scandinavian, 
liberal and continental welfare regimes.For each regime, we then propose a range of research 
frontiers and open debates, which we think are key topics regarding the politics of employment-
friendly welfare reforms. Our main focus will be on continental regimes, since their employment-
friendliness is the most strongly challenged in the post-industrial context, whereas the Nordic and 
liberal regimes succeed rather well with regard to their employment-performance. In the 
concluding part of the article, we summarize major axes for future theorizing and research.  
 
1. A new context: the transition to post-industrial economies and societies 
The linkages between labor markets and welfare state policies depend on the economic and social 
context. This context has changed profoundly over the last 30 years. Since the 1970s, the 
industrial economies have developed into very different post-industrial employment-patterns. 
Hence, welfare policies that may have been employment-functional in an industrial era may 
become employment-dysfunctional in a post-industrialist era. More generally, the linkages 
between welfare policies and labor markets must be contextualized.  
 
1.1. Multiple pressures on post-industrial labor markets: globalization, de-
industrialization, and demographic changes 
While there is wide agreement in the literature that the economic and social context of western 
welfare states has changed dramatically over the last 30 years or so, there is still much ongoing 
controversy concerning the actual sources of these changes. In the following, it is argued that there 
are three main post-industrial developments – globalization, de-industrialization and socio-
structural change – that challenge national labor markets and welfare states.  
The economic literature conceptualizes globalization mostly in terms of growing trade openness 
(see e.g. Scharpf and Schmidt 2000), capital market openness (e.g. Garrett and Mitchell 1996, 
Garrett 1998) or increased global competition in terms of price levels (e.g. Crotty 2003), wages 
(e.g. Esping-Andersen 1996) or taxes (e.g. Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000, Steinmo 2002). 
Intriguingly, both the hypotheses and the existing evidence on the impact of economic 
globalization on labor markets are mixed and not conclusive. Different authors expect either a 
strengthening of the specificities of national production regimes (e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001, for 
early forerunners, see Katzenstein 1984, Gourevitch 1986) or a growing convergence of national 
labor markets and (liberalized) welfare states (Mishra 1999). Similarly, the results remain scarce, 
so far. It is rather uncontested that the processes of globalization have contributed to 
deindustrialization and the economic downturn in western economies after the 1970s. Whether 
these developments lead to particular policy responses, notably in the direction of deregulation 
and retrenchment, however, is far from obvious. A large literature doubts that globalization 
eclipses national (welfare) state capacity (see e.g. Garrett 1998, Boyer and Drache 1996, Evans 
1997, Leibfried and Rieger 1998, Castles 2004, in a different vein, see Mishra 1999). Similarly, 
empirical studies (Garrett and Mitchell 1996, Burgoon 2001) find no or only very weak evidence 
for a direct negative impact of trade openness on social spending in the OECD (for an extensive 
annotated bibliography on globalization, see Rieger and Leibfried 1995). Hence, there is indeed 
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an agreement that increasing openness leads to a more volatile economy and thus challenges 
contemporary labor markets, but it is an open question to know how welfare states should or do 
react to these challenges.  
Iversen and Cusack challenge the globalization-literature head-on (1998). In their words, they 
“believe that the main sources of risk (in the labor market) are to be found in domestic economic 
processes” (1998: 10), more precisely in the structural transition from an industrial to a service-
economy, driven by technological change, progressive market saturation and shifting patterns of 
demand. De-industrialization is indeed the second major source of labor market changes that 
appears strongly in the literature (see in particular Esping-Andersen 1993, 1999, and Iversen and 
Wren 1998 on the “service sector trilemma”). The literature in this field argues that de-
industrialization has profound impacts on the functioning of the labor markets. A service 
economy provides ample labor demand for very high-skilled and unskilled work, but fewer job 
opportunities for middle-level skills (Wright and Dwyer 2003). Furthermore, the rise of service 
sector jobs and changing production modes go along with the spread of atypical and flexible 
work contracts. These changes pose forceful challenges to the industrial welfare states. 
In addition to globalization and de-industrialization, the social modernization since the 1960s (see 
e.g. Esping-Andersen 1999, Pierson 2001) is a third structural trend that transforms the pre-
conditions for employment-friendly welfare states. Two major trends are particularly relevant for 
labor markets and welfare states: demographic ageing and changing gender roles. An increasing 
literature (see e.g. Castles 2004, Myles and Clement 1994, Esping-Andersen et al. 2002) 
documents demographic ageing and its twofold consequences in terms of labor markets: on the 
one hand, the lack of younger generation workers will prompt a need for additional labor supply. 
On the other hand, the wealth produced by the active generation needs to finance an ever 
growing non-active population. The change in gender roles is partly linked to the declining 
fertility rates. In addition, higher female education levels and family instability contribute to the 
growing labor market participation demand of women (see e.g. Orloff et al. 1999; Orloff 2006). 
The implications for labor markets are evident and manifold: a spread of discontinuous and 
atypical employment curricula, claims for gender egalitarian arrangements in the workplace and 
growing needs to either redistribute or professionalize care work.  
The three trends of globalization, de-industrialization and social modernization create a new post-
industrial labor market characterized by lower stability, different skill-requirements, pressure for 
financial sustainability and a new distribution of work between men and women. These new 
labor markets clash with welfare states that are designed to match industrial employment 
patterns.  
 
1.2. A growing tension between post-industrial labor markets and industrial 
welfare states  
Post-industrial labor markets have become more precarious, more feminized, more unequal and 
older (Sarfati and Bonoli 2002). The fit or misfit between welfare state institutions and labor 
markets has thus become a prominent issue in the welfare state literature (see e.g. Sarfati and 
Bonoli 2002, Esping-Andersen 1999, 2004, Huber and Stephens 2001). The following list 
presents a selection of some of the major post-industrial developments that challenge the 
employment-friendliness of welfare states in specific ways.  
• Massive unemployment since the 1970s: high rates of structural unemployment and labor-
shedding strategies, such as early retirement (Ebbinghaus 2006), have dramatically reduced 
the labor market participation rate, especially in continental Europe. The low labor market 
participation rate becomes a particularly threatening problem for those countries that rely on 
employment for the financing of the welfare state, i.e. the continental regimes. In addition, 
the shift from industry to services as the major sector of employment puts into question the 
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existing educational and skill-regime that was designed to enable workers to participate in the 
industrial economy (see e.g. Iversen and Cusack 1998, Estevez-Abe et al. 2001, Hall and 
Soskice 2001, Thelen 2004). Educational and training systems need to be adapted to provide 
employees with adequate skills and re-qualification. The literature on active labor market policies 
and activation (see e.g. Clasen and Clegg 2006, Schmid 2002) deals with this first category of 
employment-friendly reforms.  
• Difficulties for outsiders to enter the labor market: Labor markets and standard employment are 
strongly protected in the continental welfare states. It can be argued that this arrangement 
was functional for the efficiency of a coordinated market economy in the industrial age 
(Estevez-Abe et al. 2001, Iversen 2005). In the recent context characterized by structural 
unemployment and the growth of labor market participation demand by women, however, 
strong employment protection may become particularly harmful to job creation and may 
drive a wedge between the interests of labor market “insiders” and “outsiders” (Rueda 2005, 
Saint-Paul 1996). In this respect, an employment-friendly welfare state is likely to pursue 
specific policies to support outsider activation and employment for the young  (Schmid 2002, 
Wilthagen and Rogowski 2002).  
• Spread of atypical/precarious work: De-industrialization and the entry of women in the labor 
market have led to a spread of atypical employment (see e.g. Talos 1999, Ferrera et al. 2000). 
The spread of flexible work raises welfare state issues: employees in atypical employment 
relations face a stronger risk of low incomes and poverty. In addition, the spread of flexible 
employment challenges certain welfare arrangements that penalize non-standard employment. 
Hence, an employment-friendly welfare state would tend to encourage such forms of labor, but also 
provide new protection for these new types of jobs. Denmark and the Netherlands have probably 
become the most prominent example of such a “flexicurity”-strategy (Visser and Hemerijck 
1997, Ferrera et al. 2000, Bredgaard et al. 2005, Klammer 2005, Sperber 2005, Wilthagen 
2002, 2003).   
• Rising income inequality: As outlined above, the spread of post-industrial jobs leads to an 
increasing accent on particularly high- and low-skilled employment profiles (Wright and 
Dwyer 2003). Scharpf and Schmidt (2000) and Iversen and Wren (1998) stress a similar point, 
when arguing that full employment in a post-industrial economy necessarily comes at the 
price of greater income inequality. The trend to rising inequality is likely to become most 
pressing in the Nordic and liberal worlds of welfare. In the Nordic welfare state, the new 
production structure may clash with the tradition of wage equalization (Pontusson and 
Swenson 1996, Clayton and Pontusson 1998). In the liberal world, the major problem is the 
rise in numbers of “working poor” (Esping-Andersen 1999, Simmons 2004). An 
employment-friendly welfare state, i.e. a welfare state that supports full employment and well-
functioning labor markets must provide adequate instruments for poverty prevention among the 
working population and/or adapted instruments of wage equalization.  
• Feminization of the labor force: The entry of women in the labor force hits different welfare 
regimes in different ways (Esping-Andersen 1999, Huber and Stephens 2001). Already in the 
industrial age, women’s labor market participation rates have been much higher in the liberal 
and Nordic welfare economies than in continental Europe, where female employment rates 
tend to be significantly below 60% (Gornick et al. 1996, Gornick and Myers 2003). This low 
female labor market participation was perfectly functional in the industrial era: it ensured full 
employment (Iversen and Wren 1998) and allowed to preserve the social and normative 
ideals of a male breadwinner society (Naumann 2005, Lewis 1993). In the post-industrial era, 
however, the male breadwinner institutions clash with both economic needs and normative 
values. An employment–friendly welfare state favors policies that allow the conciliation of work 
and care obligations for parents by means of family and labor market policies, in order to 
increase the labor market participation of women (Gornick et al. 2003, Estevez-Abe 2006).  
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From the 1980s onwards, the welfare states thus confront the need for employment-friendly 
recalibration (see e.g. Esping-Andersen et al 2002, Ferrera et al. 2000) and new social risk policies 
(see e.g. Bonoli 2005, Armingeon and Bonoli 2006, Taylor-Gooby 2004) in the areas of activation 
(incl. transitional labor markets, outsider activation, youth activation etc), flexicurity, the conciliation 
of work and care and poverty-relief for the working poor. At the same time, however, resources become 
scarce, so that all welfare states start attempts at – highly unpopular - financial consolidation and 
retrenchment (Pierson 2001). Hence, post-industrial welfare states are confronted with two 
contradictory pressures: there are demands for expansive welfare reforms in an era of austerity. 
In this difficult context, the politics of post-industrial reforms become the focus of much of the 
welfare state research: The primary question is not what needs to be done, but whether reform is 
possible at all? What are the relevant conflict lines? Who will be the key actors of post-industrial 
welfare reform?  
The literature on these questions can be divided in two strands: a first strand focuses on the more 
general reform-capacity of institutionally mature welfare states (section 2), whereas a second strand 
deals with regime-specific politics (section 3).  
 
2. The new politics of the welfare state: Can mature welfare states adapt to post-
industrialism? 
The need for employment-friendly welfare state reforms in a context of austerity has fostered a 
wide and influential literature on the question whether mature welfare states can be reformed, at 
all. At first, this “new politics of the welfare state”-literature (Pierson 1996, 2001) dealt almost 
exclusively with the question of welfare retrenchment, which is not the core of this paper. But 
the retrenchment-literature does have some relevance for our topic, since much of the more 
recent literature points to the link between retrenchment and expansive employment-friendly 
“recalibration”. The argument of the early “new politics”-literature was that over time, welfare 
reforms become increasingly difficult, since the mature welfare states themselves create the 
constituencies that are likely to oppose such restructuring. Thereby, welfare state institutions 
endogenously transform the politics of reform over time. The new politics of the welfare state 
(Pierson 1996) would thus differ from the “old” pattern of class politics, which opposed left-
wing welfare supporters to right-wing liberals. In the new context, it was argued, ever increasing 
ranks of welfare beneficiaries would mobilize for their acquired rights and create a cross-class 
coalition of status quo-defenders almost impossible to surmount in democratic regimes. A wide 
literature subsequently analyzed these obstacles for reform (e.g. Pierson 2001, Esping-Andersen 
1996, Myles and Pierson 1997, Hacker 2002). In response to the “new politics”-argument, two 
main answers appeared in the literature: Firstly, a strand of literature close to power resources 
argues that the basic pattern of class- and party-led reform orientations still holds (Korpi and 
Palme 2003, Green-Pedersen 2001). And secondly, a more recent literature specifies the 
conditions under which even highly unpopular reforms may indeed take place in advanced 
welfare states (Streeck and Thelen 2005, Hacker 2002). This second strand of literature deals 
more directly with the politics of welfare state transformation and recalibration.  
In this debate on welfare state restructuring and recalibration, we identify two areas of research, in which 
many open question on the emerging patterns of politics still persist: 
 
• What are the conditions for the implementation of “unpopular” reforms?  
Unpopular reforms comprise retrenchment of benefit levels, but they also refer to employment-
friendly reforms such as re-commodification and labor market flexibilization. Many of these 
reforms have been implemented in Western Europe over the last decades and they challenge the 
neo-institutionalist claim of stasis and path-dependency. Several explanations exist, but they have 
not yet been tested systematically and explicitly against each other. Pierson himself argued that 
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restrictive reforms can only be implemented by political leaders against the constituencies of 
beneficiaries, if the consequences of the reforms are non-transparent or obfuscated (1996, 2001). 
However, there have been many very significant reforms over the last years, some of them highly 
mediatized and heatedly debated in the public arena. Alternative explanations for these reforms 
appeared in the literature: Bonoli and Palier (2007) argue that structural changes are based on 
accumulation of a series of reforms in which retrenchment reforms strategically exempt particular 
groups from negative consequences (e.g. pensioners). Somewhat similarly, Bonoli (2001), Levy 
(1999) and Häusermann (2006, 2007) argue and show that retrenchment reforms tend to be 
strategically tied packages (“modernizing compromises”, Bonoli 2001) that divide the (potential) 
opponents of a reform, by providing them with selective compensations. Finally, Kitschelt (2001) 
argues that “unpopular” reforms are implemented by governments who face little “electoral 
threat”, i.e. they have no competitor who might credibly defend a pro-welfare position. This last 
argument comes close to the “Nixon goes to China”-logic, developed by Fiona Ross (2000). 
Hence, many hypotheses are on the table, but there is no explicit testing of these hypotheses 
against each other and no conclusive evidence on the determinants (political parties, ideas etc.) of 
unpopular reforms, such as retrenchment or labor market flexibilization.   
 
• The politics of recalibration:  
A different strand of reform analyzes the politics of employment-friendly reforms more directly, 
i.e. without referring to the wider context of austerity and retrenchment. What are the politics of 
welfare state recalibration in the direction of activation, flexicurity and work-care conciliation? 
One idea – which is similar to the argument on “modernizing compromises” in the retrenchment 
literature - can be found in the literature on “social pacts” (Rhodes 2001, Ebbinghaus and Hassel 
2000). These authors observed that corporatist policy-making had not collapsed in the 1990s (as 
some had expected, see e.g. Schmitter and Grote 1997), but quite contrarily, had re-surfaced in 
several European countries, such as Italy, the Netherlands or Ireland (Rhodes 2001, Regini 2000, 
Ferrera and Hemerijck 2003), bringing about activation, flexicurity-policies and wage restraint in 
several countries.  How could this happen? Generally this literature argues that the recent social 
pacts do not follow the same patterns as earlier corporatist pacts. This means that trade unions 
and employers are not the key actors anymore, because they are not able anymore to come to 
agreements through self-restraint and compromising. Rather, this literature argues, the new social 
pacts of labor market and welfare recalibration are the result of EMU pressure (Hancké and 
Rhodes 2005, Rhodes 2001, 2003), stronger state unilateralism (Hassel 2003, Rhodes 2000a, Ross 
2000), and/or new types of concertation and negotiation (Ferrera and Gualmini 2000, Hemerijck 
and Visser 2000). Hence, the open question with regard to the recalibration-capacity of Western 
welfare states is whether employment-friendly recalibration is the result of rare and contingent 
favorable circumstances (such as EMU-pressure, technocratic government), or whether these 
pacts represent a new mode of policy-making in the post-industrial era (Avdagic, Rhodes and 
Visser 2005). 
With regard to employment-friendly family-policy recalibration, rather similar questions have 
surfaced and remain on the agenda. Reforms aimed at balancing work and family life have gained 
momentum in many West European countries since the 1990s, and it has been observed that the 
politics of work-care conciliation do not correspond to the “old” patterns of class-conflict. 
Rather, these policies give rise to new coalitions of parties, employers and civil society 
organizations, and they are backed by EU legislation (Jenson and Sineau 2001, Ferrarini 2006, 
Orloff 2006, Häusermann 2006). However, it remains unclear so far whether these new coalitions 
are selective, or whether they reflect a pattern of politics that is going to last.  
Overall, there remains a range of unresolved questions in the recalibration-literature: It is mainly 
unclear whether these reforms are exogenously induced by supranational legislation, whether they 
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are the result of strong governments and unilateral reforms, or whether they result from a new 
pattern of preferences and power-relations among traditional political actors.  
 
In this section we have briefly reviewed two strands of literature that deal with the politics of 
welfare state restructuring and recalibration. From very early on, however, a wide literature has 
pointed our the fact that the post-industrial challenges to welfare states and labor markets will 
differ between the regimes (Huber et al 1999; Kitschelt et al. 1999, Scharpf and Schmidt 2000, 
Pierson 2001). Consequently, the politics of employment-friendly reforms also differ accross 
these regimes and the literature must be analyzed and discussed separately.  
 
3. Different reform agendas, different politics  
Comparative research published in the early 2000s has shown that each welfare and labor market 
regime has its specific vulnerabilities, in particular for maintaining employment (Scharpf and 
Schmidt 2000). If the challenges vary, so do the solutions: we can identify three approaches to 
reform, each of them reflecting the distinctive historical and institutional challenges of a 
particular social protection regime. Paul Pierson argues that the agenda of each regime is 
dominated by one type of welfare and labor market reform: in liberal regimes, reform is based on 
re-commodification; in social democratic regimes, reform is based on cost-containment; and in 
continental regimes, reform is based on recalibration, which adjusts social programs to new risks 
and needs (Pierson 2001: Conclusion).  
Here, we will focus on the politics of employment-friendly welfare reforms. The discussions of 
the politics of reform in the three regime-types are structured similarly. We start with the 
identification of the key issues on the agenda of employment-friendly reforms, before reviewing 
some major open research debates on specific aspects of these reforms.  
 
3.1. Nordic welfare states: Reinforcing a successful regime 
The Nordic welfare states are characterized by high levels of social expenditure and taxes and by 
low levels of poverty, as well as low income and gender inequality. Therefore, they have been 
portrayed as “big and fat” welfare regimes (Kautto and Kvist 2002: 191). However, one of the 
keys to understanding Nordic welfare states is the very high employment rate, which is partly the 
result of a large public sector and activation policies. The high level of activation provides the 
means for the large scope of tax-financed welfare. Hence, since the welfare policies of the Nordic 
regimes aim at ensuring full employment of all adults by means of activation, work-care 
infrastructure and public sector employment, they can roughly be seen as the “employment-
friendly pioneers” , which may inspire many of the employment-friendly reform attempts in 
other countries, notably the continental welfare states.  
Nevertheless, there is a recent literature that discusses the sustainability of the employment 
performance in Nordic regimes. In the 1990s, the Nordic model became strongly challenged by a 
macroeconomic downturn. Unemployment rates in Sweden and Finland increased almost five-
fold between 1990 and 1993 (Kautto and Kvist 2002), and the employment performance also 
declined in Denmark and Norway. In this context, some authors asked whether the Nordic 
welfare states would remain sustainable, or whether we should expect a race to the bottom, i.e. a 
downward convergence with the smaller welfare states in continental Europe and the anglo-
saxon countries (Lindbeck 1997, Mishra 1999, Steinmo 2002, review in Kautto and Kvist 2002, 
for a skeptical viewpoint on these challenges, Huber and Stephens 1997). Indeed, some 
indications of major change in politics became visible, e.g. when the Swedish employers 
temporarily left the administrative boards of social policy governance (Pontusson and Swenson 
1998, Pestoff 2002) So far, however, the convergence thesis has received very little support. In a 
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large research project, Kautto et al. (2001) show a) that there is a clearly recognizable Nordic 
model, b) that parallel developments with other (continental) countries remain limited and c) that 
there is no dismantling of the Nordic welfare states (Kautto et al 2001). Quite the contrary, the 
Swedish employment-centered welfare state has become a reference point not only for the EU 
and other Nordic states developing activation further (Kvist 2003), but also for the continental 
Welfare regimes seeking to implement employment-friendly reforms. 
Hence, there is wide agreement, that after a short crisis in the 1990s, the Nordic regimes basically 
stick to their traditional road of welfare and even intensify it. However, several questions about 
the politics of reform remain debated in the literature. We identify three major questions about 
Nordic reform politics: a) What accounts for the strength and spread of activation policies? b) 
what are the main conflict lines in Nordic welfare reforms? More precisely, what is the role of the 
trade unions in the recalibration of welfare regimes towards employment-favoring policies? And 
c) a third debate deals with the actual sustainability of the Nordic model. 
 
• The spread of activation policies in the 1990s 
While Sweden has always been a pioneer in terms of activation policies (Dropping et al. 1999), 
these employment-centered reforms (here understood as active labor market measures) have 
spread massively in the other Nordic countries in the 1990s. At the end of the 1990s, Denmark 
and Finland had even overtaken Sweden as the front-runners in activation, with Denmark being 
particularly innovative and successful (Kvist 2003a). In terms of employment-friendly welfare 
reforms, the key question is of course how we can explain these reforms. The jury is still out on 
the question whether these policies are the result external constraints and problem load 
(Dropping et a. 1999), the particularities of the industrial structure (Goul Andersen 2007), 
ideational leadership by international actors (Hvinden et al. 2001) or more political factors such 
as coordination capacity and state strength (Martin and Thelen forthcoming).  
 
• Trade unions: new sectoral cleavages or encompassing “modernized” unions?  
A second major debate in the literature on the development of Nordic welfare state politics deals 
with the relevant cleavages for policy-making, and – more specifically – with the role of the trade 
unions. Much of the literature of the late 1990s (Iversen and Wren 1998, Pontusson and Swenson 
1996, Notermans 2000) has pointed to a growing intra-labor divide between economic sectors 
sheltered from international competition (mainly the public and private service sector) and the 
economic sectors exposed to growing pressures for competitiveness (mainly the large 
manufacturing industry). The decline in Swedish corporatism in the 1990s (Pontusson and 
Swenson 1996, Pestoff 2002) points in a similar direction, because the employers of the large 
firms temporarily withdraw from the negotiation table. Similarly, other observers also point to 
newly emerging conflict lines that may divide the interests of labor (Sainsbury 1996 on gender 
conflict, Steinmo 2002 on the erosion of worker solidarity). However, the more recent literature 
points to a renewed success of the Nordic model, with reforms agreed upon by all major actors, 
including the union movement and the state (Martin and Thelen forthcoming)3. How can we 
explain persisting labor cohesion in the Nordic regimes? How did the Nordic trade unions 
manage to remain encompassing organizations in the context of post-industrialism?  These are 
important questions, especially in the light of the growing intra-labor divides that are witnessed in 
the continental regimes.  
 
• The sustainability of the Nordic model  
                                                
3 In addition, Ebbinghaus (2006a) shows that the Nordic union movement is still much more encompassing and 
representative in terms of skill-levels and gender than the continental unions. 
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Iversen and Wren in their article on the service sector trilemma (1998) point to the fact that low 
income inequality and full employment in a service economy may only come at a very high 
budgetary and fiscal cost. Therefore, Iversen and Wren expected that the Nordic model may put 
the interests of the high-productivity private sector against the interests of the low-productivity 
(public) service sector and thus lead to attacks against the high tax levels. Steinmo (2002) answers 
this debate by closely examining the Swedish tax policy since the 1980s. He finds that Sweden has 
indeed deeply reformed the tax system in the early 1990s, but in a way that did not dismantle the 
system, but broaden the tax base while at the same time lowering marginal tax rates for both 
workers and firms. Overall, the reform made the system less progressive and it could be seen as a 
threat to the Swedish welfare model. However, as Scharpf and Schmidt (2000) argued, the 
problem of sustainability is as much economic as political: the main question is whether citizens 
in the Nordic states are – and will remain - sufficiently satisfied with the public services to 
consider the high tax levels legitimate. 
 
3.2. Liberal welfare states: from welfare to workfare 
In the wake of Pierson’s contributions (1994, 1996), much of the literature on liberal welfare 
states in the 1990s focused on the issue of reform capacity vs. institutional stability. Pierson had 
shown that even the right-wing governments in the US and the UK were unable to implement 
radical retrenchment, in times when they faced in principle very favorable political conditions to 
do so (context of crisis, right-wing ideology, firm majorities, weak unions). Hence, the focus of 
the literature was mostly on the reform (in-)capacity of liberal regimes and on institutional 
stability (Myles and Pierson 1997). With the development of the “third way” in the UK from 
1997 onwards, however, the liberal welfare states – especially Britain – became the forerunners of 
“employment-friendly welfare reforms”. The whole welfare state was largely reoriented towards 
extensive workfare schemes, intended to raise employment and to replace compensation by 
activation. With regard to the politics of workfare and the third way, Taylor-Gooby (2001) shows 
that they were clearly the result of a major political convergence of the Conservative and the 
Labor Party. Equally clear is the apparent “success” of these employment-focused policies in the 
sense that the liberal countries managed to achieve very high levels of activation4 (for a critical 
view on the third way’s effectiveness, see Clasen and Clegg 2004).  
The orientation of liberal welfare states towards activation and social investment raises several 
important issues on the politics and consequences of this employment-focused strategy. We 
discuss two of them in the following. 
 
• Third way workfare policies aim ideally at a social investment state. What are the political dynamics of this 
development? What are the determinants of social investment?  
Third way politics insist on the individual opportunities / responsibilities, instead of rights. The 
underlying idea is what Lister (2004) calls a “social investment state”, i.e. a state that enables 
citizens to care for themselves, rather than being cared for. The idea has been most strongly 
developed in the “New Deal” of the Blair government, providing jobs, education and training for 
unemployed people as a condition of receipt of benefits (“workfare”). However, the “make work 
pay” programs widen the gap between those in and out of work, because more means-tested 
support is directed to low-income families in work, while benefits are minimal for those out of 
work. What are the politics of social investment? The “Welfare to Work”-program of the Blair 
government was supported by British employers, while they opposed the minimum wage. Is the 
                                                
4 However, workfare and liberal labor market policies increased job performance, but they mostly produced jobs at 
the higher and very low end of the income distribution, squeezing out the middle classes (e.g. Wright and Dwyer 
2003). 
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third way activation strategy only a different sort of neoliberal policy, framing retrenchment as an 
increase of individual responsibility and opportunity? Or is the social investment state a new left 
strategy to reconcile financial austerity with some sort of equality? Is it a way to “turn vice into 
virtue” (Levy 1999)? And will it become a larger paradigm for policy reform all over Europe, now 
that the EU has adopted the strategy and discourse (Jenson, Saint Martin, 2006)? On this debate, 
see also Lewis and Surender 2004 and – more generally - Green-Pedersen et al. 2001,).    
 
• Workfare in the liberal welfare states has the problematic side-effect of raising wage inequality, working 
poverty and precarious jobs. What are the politics of making workfare socially sustainable?   
Somewhat in contrast to the “neoliberal” convergence between the left and the right on the third 
way, Taylor-Gooby (2001, 2004) nevertheless shows that New Labor in Britain did increase 
provision for low-paid workers and low-income families (see also Taylor-Gooby and Pernille 
Larsen 2005). Labor also increased the less visible taxes for higher income groups and introduced 
a minimum wage. This resembles the “classic strategy” of a liberal welfare state, i.e. a reliance on 
means-tested minimum benefits for particularly vulnerable groups. What is particularly notable in 
terms of politics is that these improvements of redistribution are “granted” rather than achieved 
by the beneficiaries themselves. As Taylor-Gooby points out (2001), the victims of these trends 
are unable to gain a political voice within the institutional framework of decision-making in the 
UK.    
 
3.3.  Continental welfare states: the politics of regime transformation 
Continental welfare states are the most challenged of all regime-types, because they are most 
severely hit by the “welfare without work” problem. In terms of Iversen and Wren’s (1998) 
service sector trilemma, continental welfare states have long privileged wage equality and 
budgetary stability over full employment. Hence, employment levels in continental welfare states 
have become particularly low. Continental welfare states also display particularly low levels of 
female activity and an early “de facto” retirement age, due to extensive early retirement schemes 
and low labor market opportunities for the elderly.  
To a large extent, continental welfare states thus cumulate all the typical problems of a post-
industrial society (Esping-Andersen 1996): Social security is mostly provided through insurance 
schemes, which are financed by pay-roll taxes. Hence, low labor market participation undermines 
the stability of the welfare state. In addition, and in spite of the low female labor market 
participation rate, fertility is lowest in continental Europe, which also undermines the long-term 
stability of the PAYG-pension schemes. Furthermore, the policy implications of the male 
breadwinner model (lack of care infrastructure, derived instead of individualized rights etc.) are in 
plain contrast to the changing values and needs of a post-industrial society. Moreover, the social 
insurance architecture of the continental welfare state focuses on standard employment and fails 
to provide adequate social provision to “new risk” groups, such as atypically employed, young 
families etc. And finally, low female employment and strong horizontal and vertical gender 
segregation of the labor market impacts negatively on the economic performance of these 
countries. This list of the major strains on continental regimes indicates that the lacking 
employment opportunities are at the core of most problems of these welfare states. Hence, the 
question whether, how, and to what extent employment-friendly policies – activation, work-care 
conciliation, flexicurity - can be implemented is key.  
Much of the literature has argued that the continental welfare states are “frozen”, i.e. particularly 
difficult to reform (Esping-Andersen 1996, Pierson 2001). This is due to the very institutional 
architecture of these states, building on insurance, which is not only very legitimate in the eyes of 
the contributors, but also reinforces the power of the beneficiaries of existing schemes (Pierson 
2001, Bonoli and Palier 2000). Since all contributors are stakeholders in the insurance regime, 
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they will have an interest in preventing change, so that reforms should be particularly difficult. In 
addition, activation and employment-friendly policies often target outsiders and new risk groups, 
who are particularly marginalized in continental welfare states (Clegg 2007). Consequently, much 
of the literature stresses the strong problem-load in continental Europe, and the particularly 
problematic circumstances for employment-friendly reforms (see e.g. Huber and Stephens 2001, 
Scharpf and Schmid 2000, Armingeon and Bonoli 2006, Esping-Andersen 1996, 1999).   
Despite all these rather pessimistic, yet highly plausible explanations for inertia, a growing 
literature has emerged since the end of the 1990s documenting far-reaching changes in 
continental welfare states (see e.g. Palier 2002, Clasen 2005, Streeck and Thelen 2005, Bleses and 
Seeleib-Kaiser 2004, Palier and Martin 2007). Not only did most of them massively scale back 
existing rights in core policy field such as pensions or unemployment benefits (Schludi 2004, 
Clasen and Clegg 2006) but most of them also expanded employment-friendly policies by 
strengthening active labor market measures, flexicurity for atypical workers or external care 
infrastructure for working women (see e.g. Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004, Rhodes 2001, 
Hemerijck et al 2000, Gornick and Meyers 2003, Leitner et al 2004, Clasen 2005, Levy 1999). All 
these reforms seemed highly unlikely in the context of continental regimes. Consequently, they 
have triggered a large and growing literature on the change of political dynamics and politics in 
continental welfare states. In this literature, many different explanations of recent political 
dynamics exist, but most debates remain unsettled so far. In the following paragraphs, we give an 
overview of the state of several selected debates.  
 
• Which are the relevant conflict-lines in post-industrial continental welfare politics: class, insider/outsider 
status, gender, values? Are these newly observable conflict lines ephemeral or a deeper restructuring of the 
patterns of policy-making?  
There are several tentative explanations of the recent, highly unlikely, reform profile of 
continental welfare states. Some authors refer to the mere problem-load and to the ideational 
leadership of governments, convincing people of the need for cuts (see e.g. Kitschelt and Streeck 
2003, Stiller 2007). Others refer to exogenous factors, notably pressure from the EU (Ferrera and 
Gualmini 2000a). However, many observers also note that the conflict structure in continental 
European welfare politics has changed. The recent reforms tend to be implemented by highly 
“unlikely” (cross-class) coalitions of actors. Several hypotheses exist with regard to the nature of 
these new conflict structures: Häusermann (2007) shows that labor unions and political parties 
tends to become more and more split with regard to insider/outsider-status, skill-levels and 
value-orientations. A progressive, high skilled left-wing constituency parts company with the 
rather conservative blue-collar workforce, the main clientele of the trade unions. Kitschelt and 
Rehm (2005) underline this finding by showing that the left (Social Democrats and trade unions) 
in continental Europe increasingly relies on an electorate with extremely heterogeneous welfare 
preferences. Rueda (2007) also stresses the importance of insider-outsider politics in employment 
policy reforms. Insiders claim employment protection, whereas outsiders claim active labor 
market policies. Hence, outsiders may become an ally of forces who want to reduce employment 
protection. Rhodes’s (2001) argument on social pacts goes in a similar direction. Outsider policies 
have the potential to divide labor. In sum, employment-friendly reforms in continental regimes 
may divide labor and more generally the left and open new avenues to cross-class alliances. An 
additional open question is whether these new alliances correspond to punctual “ambiguous 
agreements” (Palier 2005), which are highly instable and ephemeral (e.g. Ballestri and Bonoli 
2003), or whether they reflect a deeper reconfiguration of the underlying class structure (Oesch 
2006, Kitschelt and Rehm 2005, Häusermann 2007).  
 
• Who are the winners and losers of the recent employment-friendly reforms (such as flexible labor markets, 
activation, flexicurity, female labor market participation)?  
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Is the growing accent of the continental welfare states on outsider activation and new risk 
protection actually a welfare state expansion (Bonoli 2005, Häusermann 2007, Bleses and Seeleib-
Kaiser 2004, Riedmüller et al 2000) or are these policies merely minor sweeteners to a trend 
towards retrenchment, growing inequality and precariousness (Clegg 2007, Palier 2002, Leibfried 
and Obinger 2003)? This question about the winners and losers of recent recalibration is at the 
core of a debate on the effects of recent reforms in terms of social stratification. Indeed, even 
though most continental welfare states have developed and extended their welfare support for 
the social groups most at risk (low-skilled, low-wage earners, young families etc), in the end they 
may still not be better off than people with similar characteristics 10-20 years ago. This debate 
relates, of course, to the question of welfare-reform measurement (Clasen and Siegel 2007). It is 
relevant to the understanding of recalibrating politics, because the distributional effects of these 
reforms feed back into subsequent reform processes.  
 
• What is the role of corporatism in continental welfare state reforms? Has it turned from an advantage to a 
liability? And why have the trade unions in some countries become “reformist” and inclined to employment-
friendly policies, whereas they oppose the same reforms in others?  
For a long time, corporatism was seen as an integral part of the continental welfare states, 
ensuring reform-capacity and social peace, especially in small states (Katzenstein 1984) and in 
times of crisis (Gourevitch 1986). More recent studies, however, question the role of trade 
unions. Several studies (Ebbinghaus and Hassel 2000, Rhodes 2001, Kitschelt and Streeck 2003, 
Häusermann 2005) show that in various cases of employment-friendly policies, they have even 
become a major impediment for reform. Quite to the contrast, however, trade unions have been 
at the heart of the employment-focused reforms in the Netherlands (Visser and Hemerijck 1997). 
There is an unresolved debate on the role and strength of labor in these recent reforms. Why do 
they play such different roles in different countries? What factors does their position depend 
upon? There are some hints in the literature: Ebbinghaus (2006a) points to the selective 
representation of trade unions in continental Europe: women and service sector workers are 
strongly underrepresented, compared to the Nordic states. And Trampusch (2004) shows for 
Germany that the ties between party and union elites are becoming weaker. This may also 
contribute to changing the role of unions. Moreover, Ebbinghaus and Hassel (2000) argue that 
trade unions only cooperated in social pacts where the state was strong enough to threaten with 
unilateral intervention in case of the failure of negotiations.  
 
Conclusion 
The transition to post-industrialism has generated a range of new tensions between welfare state 
arrangements and labor market performance, which confront today’s welfare states with new 
challenges for employment-friendly recalibration. In this article, we have discussed a wide range 
of literature that deals with the capacity of welfare states to adapt to these challenges, and with 
the political determinants of this adaptation process. The overview of this dynamically evolving 
literature shows that – contrary to the expectations of stasis and inertia that dominated the neo-
institutionalist literature in the 1990s – there have been far-reaching changes in most welfare 
regimes, in the direction of employment-friendly policies such as flexicurity, activation, work-care 
conciliation and social investments. The Nordic welfare states are the champions of these 
policies, and their success in terms of both employment performance and social welfare also 
turns the spotlight on the politics of employment-friendly reform strategies in the liberal and 
continental regimes. However, both the reforms themselves and the research that analyzes their 
determinants are evolving rapidly and most research debates have not yet been solved. Therefore, 
we have outlined and discussed a range of research questions that we consider particularly 
relevant and fruitful avenues for future theorizing and research. In conclusion, we would like to 
summarize them briefly. 
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The literature on recalibration in a context of financial austerity shows that most re-
commodifying and employment-friendly reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s have been the 
result of political dynamics and coalitions that differ from the old patterns of class politics (e.g. 
Rhodes 2001, Ferrera and Hemerijck 2003, Ebbinghaus and Hassel 2003). Divided trade unions, 
selective cross-class alliances and new party dynamics characterize these reforms. However, there 
remains disagreement on two issues: on the one hand, there are competing hypotheses whether 
these “new politics” are the result of external pressure, stronger unilateral state intervention or 
underlying electoral dynamics. And on the other hand, we still do not know whether the new 
alliances and coalitional dynamics represent a stable new pattern of recalibrating policy-making, 
or whether they are ephemeral and selective. Qualitative comparative research, and a stronger 
focus on the link between the changing socio-structural constituencies and actor positions in the 
policy-process could take this debate further.  
Aside this general debate on recalibration-capacity, we proposed and discussed more regime-
specific debates. The Nordic welfare states have so far been the most successful regimes in terms 
of employment-friendly policy reforms. Activation, flexicurity and work-care policies have spread 
massively, particularly in Sweden and Denmark over the 1990s (e.g. Kautto et al. 1999, 2001, 
Kvist 2003a), and the blooming job performance in these countries makes policy-makers and 
researchers in other regimes turn their eyes on the factors that explain the adaptation capacity of 
these welfare states. In terms of politics, it is striking to see that most of these reforms were 
adopted by large coalitions of state actors, parties, employers and encompassing trade unions (e.g. 
Kvist 2003a, Martin and Thelen forthcoming). The literature so far provides different 
explanations for this coordination capacity, referring notably to state strength, external pressure 
and the strategies of trade unions. Future research may put a focus on the interrelation and 
relative impact of these factors, in order to provide valuable lessons for the future and for other 
regimes.  
Employment-friendly reforms took a particular form in liberal welfare states, relying on workfare 
first and a more encompassing approach of social investment later on, especially in the UK (e.g. 
Taylor-Gooby 2001, 2004, Lister 2004, Lewis and Surender 2004). In contrast to other regimes, 
these policies correspond to government strategies, rather than negotiated compromises. Given 
that the current policies feed back into future reforms, and also given that the EU is adopting a 
similar “social investment” policy orientation, it is important to assess the nature and 
distributional implications of these reforms, in particular for low-income groups. Is the social 
investment strategy a new way of overcoming the equality-efficiency trade-off, or does it widen 
the gap between the high-skilled workforce and the – politically voiceless –unskilled workers? 
Continental welfare states struggle most strongly with the reorientation of their welfare states 
towards post-industrial labor markets. Employment-friendly reform politics not only deviate 
from the established logic of insider-oriented, male breadwinner welfare states, but they also blur 
established conflict lines. A wide literature shows that recalibrating reforms follow different 
logics of political division than “old” social insurance-reforms (e.g. Rhodes 2001, Kitschelt and 
Rehm 2005, Bonoli 2005, Häusermann 2007, Rueda 2007). In this respect, the salience of the 
insider-outsiders divide is certainly an important open research debate that should receive 
attention in the future. The literature is still scarce in showing who advocates insider- and 
outsider-interests, under what conditions they can be heard and how recalibration affects the 
balance of power between them. This is a key issue not only for explaining reform opportunities, 
but also for assessing the distributional implications of these reforms. In this respect particular 
attention should be given to the role of trade unions in organizing and advocating the interests of 
different constituencies of insiders, outsiders, women and the service sector workforce. A 
comparison with the encompassing union movement in the Nordic welfare regimes tends to 
suggest that the future of the work-welfare nexus in continental welfare states will depend 
strongly on the internal reform capacity of continental trade unions.  
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Finally, and this has not been the topic of our article, future research should pay particular 
attention to the distributional implications and effects of employment-friendly welfare reforms, 
because they bear very strong relevance for subsequent reforms. Indeed, reform processes are 
heavily influenced by policy feedbacks and learning processes. Hence, theories of policy reform 
dynamics must build on a deep understanding of the determinants and effects of preceding 
reforms. 
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